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The serious consequences of the decades long flawed German energy policy came finally into light

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On Monday 17 October 2022, after weeks of debate, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ordered the German Ministry of Economics (responsible for electricity generation) and the Ministry of the Environment (responsible for nuclear safety, among other things) to create the legal and other conditions to ensure that, if necessary, all three remaining German nuclear reactors can continue operation until 15 April 2023. It is worth noting that before the Fukushima accident in 2011, 17 nuclear power plant units were in operation in Germany. Following the events in Japan, within a few weeks, and in what I believe was a series of premature steps, the German government ordered the permanent closure of the 8 oldest units shortly after the events in Japan, and a decision was taken to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2022. Over the past decade, a series of units have been shut down, leaving three still in operation. So, at the end of this year, although there is no technical or nuclear safety reas

How to solve the Zaporizhzhya NPP crisis - an expert proposal

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The whole world has been watching with deep concern what has happened and is happening in and around the Zaporizhzhya NPP in Ukraine during the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war. To be clear: armed attacks and threatening to attack civilian nuclear facilities are contrary to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This - wherever it happens - is unacceptable and must be strongly condemned. The situation that has now developed at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant violates the fundamental rules of the nuclear industry. It also makes impossible to work professionally in the field of nuclear safety, physical protection and safeguards of the given nuclear facility. In addition to the risk of direct physical impact, it increases the possibility of human error by orders of magnitude. Nuclear power plants are designed to withstand a range of external and internal hazards, which are taken into account in

What to do in the event of an incident involving a significant release of radioactive material?

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In recent days, following the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian invasion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site and the attack on the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant , many people have asked me what the impact of a nuclear accident in Ukraine could be on Hungary (or on Europe), and what to do in such an event. I will try to summarise this briefly in this paper. Basics As I have written several times before, nuclear power plants are designed for a wide range of malfunctions and initial events of various internal and external origin. These so-called "design basis accidents" can be handled by the safety systems of nuclear power plants without resulting in large radioactive releases. However, as we have seen for example in the Fukushima accident, if a nuclear power plant is left without cooling water and without electricity supply (without functioning emergency diesel generators and a functioning electrical grid connection), this can result in a series

You just can't do that in Nuclear Power Plants!

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The official YouTube channel of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant has a video of the Russian troops' attack on the plant, which at the time of this blog post has reached 4.2 million views. The footage, which lasts more than 4 hours, was recorded by a security surveillance camera and, although in low light, shows how the Russian attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP on 4 March 2022 could have happened. A more detailed, time-series analysis of the footage is available on this portal . This article is very interesting not only because it highlights the most relevant parts of the long security camera footage, but also because it shows the damage caused to the plant by the Russian attack, based on additional photos and video recordings of the plant. It is clear from the footage that the Russian troops did not fire "only" at the training building: shots were also fired at Units 1 and 6, a transmission line pole was hit, and shoulder-launched rockets were fired at the main of