The serious consequences of the decades long flawed German energy policy came finally into light

On Monday 17 October 2022, after weeks of debate, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ordered the German Ministry of Economics (responsible for electricity generation) and the Ministry of the Environment (responsible for nuclear safety, among other things) to create the legal and other conditions to ensure that, if necessary, all three remaining German nuclear reactors can continue operation until 15 April 2023.

It is worth noting that before the Fukushima accident in 2011, 17 nuclear power plant units were in operation in Germany. Following the events in Japan, within a few weeks, and in what I believe was a series of premature steps, the German government ordered the permanent closure of the 8 oldest units shortly after the events in Japan, and a decision was taken to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2022. Over the past decade, a series of units have been shut down, leaving three still in operation. So, at the end of this year, although there is no technical or nuclear safety reason to do so, the remaining three units should have been decommissioned under previous political decisions.

But then came the Russia-Ukraine war, and the energy crisis that followed, which put into question the security of electricity and gas supplies not only for Germany but for the entire European Union. As balancing weather-dependent renewables requires large amounts of conventional power plants (despite the green propaganda to the contrary), German electricity supply has in recent years increasingly relied on natural gas - mainly imported from Russia - as a balancing energy source, alongside the development of weather-dependent renewables, the phasing out of nuclear power and the reduction of coal use. It should not be forgotten that, in the meantime, the country, traditionally an electricity exporter, has been forced back into a neutral or often net importer position. However, in the current situation, the supply of natural gas has been seriously called into question, and the decision has been taken to make greater use of the most environmentally damaging German lignite-fired power plants, and since the summer there has been intense debate on whether to extend the operating life of the nuclear power plants still in operation.

It should be noted that the three German operational pressurized water reactors represent a total capacity of 3 * 1400 MW, 4200 MW, and these German units produced more electricity than the German offshore wind power plants in the first half of 2022, 6% of the total German production, so we are not talking about negligible capacity. Given that in France more than half of the nuclear fleet is currently non-operational due to technical problems, and the limited natural gas available should not be used for electricity generation, but that the three nuclear power plants still have all the nuclear fuel available, and that German nuclear power is likely to be needed in the cold winter months, it is perfectly logical to suggest that the technically sound, state-of-the-art German nuclear power plants, which were commissioned in 1988-1989, should not be shut down in the middle of the worst energy crisis.

The only problem is that the Greens are currently coalition partners in the German government, alongside the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, and the Greens hold the posts of Minister for the Economy and Climate Protection and Minister for the Environment. So a decision must be taken, involving Green politicians, as to whether nuclear power plants, which are technically and from a nuclear nuclear safety point of view perfect and fully operational, should be kept in operation, at least for the winter, when there is no longer enough natural gas in Europe and there is a question of whether consumers can be supplied with the electricity they need.

For a long time it seemed that the Greens would be relentless, but in recent weeks a compromise has emerged that would shut down the three reactors still in operation on 31 December 2022 and keep them in reserve until the end of the spring 2023. But that doesn't make much sense in an energy crisis, because a nuclear power plant is not something that you keep in cold reserve and then, if you want to, you can start it up at the push of a button. Calculations by energy suppliers have shown that nuclear power is likely to be needed in the winter. In this case, however, they should not be kept in reserve, they should be operated.

Last weekend the Greens considered at length what to do, even convening a party congress on the issue (obviously the Green Party Congress is highly competent on both security of supply and nuclear safety issues J), and they came to the conclusion that they propose to keep two of the three units in reserve, to operate until 15 April 2023 if necessary. So far, the Greens have totally refused to provide the fresh fuel needed to keep the third unit in operation.

In comparison, the Social Democrat Chancellor surprised his ministers on Monday 17th October by deciding and mandating that all three units remain in operation until April 2023. It was a difficult decision to take in a difficult situation, and that is perhaps understandable. However, the real irresponsibility of energy policy lies in the fact that the units do not have the necessary fuel available.

Germany, the largest economy in the European Union, is not in a position to fuel its nuclear power plants that are in operation and can technically continue to operate. And coalition partners have been arguing for months about whether to order more fuel for the units. While three of the four pipelines of Nord Stream 1 and 2 have been blown up, there is no gas from Russia to Germany, winter is approaching and technical calculations show that the available electricity generation capacity may not be sufficient for the winter months. Germany, renowned for its environmental and climate protection, is ramping up the operation of its lignite power plants and waiting for winter. And still the green party disagrees to order new fuel for the fully operational nuclear reactors. In my view, we are seeing the consequences of a flawed energy policy that is heavily burdened with security of supply risks.

The Isar NPP in Bavaria (Source: E.ON Kernkraft GmbH, CC BY-SA 3.0)

 

The three units still in operation are Isar-2 in Bavaria, Neckarwestheim-2 in Baden-Württemberg and Emsland in Lower Saxony. Let's take a look at these units.

• In order to ensure that Isar-2 can continue to operate during the winter, it will be shut down in the coming days for planned maintenance of the safety valve of the pressurizer located in the primary circuit. After that, it will be possible to restart the unit. As the operator has so far expected that the Government will not allow the unit to operate after end of December 2022, they have not purchased sufficient quantities of fresh fuel. It is therefore expected to be able to operate for a limited period from January in a special, so-called sliding mode control. (Technically, this means a special mode in which the steam pressure of the turbine and the average temperature in the primary circuit will be gradually and slowly reduced to compensate for the higher than normal fuel burn-up and to keep the unit running. ) The Chancellor's decision is to go down to 55% of the nominal power at a decreasing rate from week to week, at which point the unit will have to stop operating.

• The plan is to shut down the Neckarwestheim-2 unit on 31 December and, if the power supply situation requires, to assemble a functional reactor core using the fuel from the spent fuel pool and then decide whether to keep it in reserve or restart it.

• So far, the Greens have been very reluctant to use the Emsland nuclear power plant, so they have not even seriously considered whether it could also be put into operation from January. As a consequence, the exact technical concept is not yet available.

It is worth pointing out that the three German nuclear power units in question (currently 33-34 years old) have up to 30-40 years of operating life left. Shutting them down for purely political reasons in the current energy supply crisis is a huge mistake and, in fact, a self-defeating move that reduces the room for maneuver not only for Germany but for the entire European electricity market. Of course, this process has been going on for 10 years and has obviously significantly eroded German nuclear competence and industrial capabilities, but even so, the current situation shows how problematic is the path on which German energy policy is heading.

It is surprising that, although the winter is very close, there is still so much uncertainty about the future operation of the three nuclear units, but it is certainly a positive development that Chancellor Scholz's decision at least gives a direction and allows the actors to focus on implementation.

It is a common view in the German electricity industry - and the impression of this is also reflected in the German press - that the winter of 2023/2024 could be even more complicated than the winter we are facing now, so that the aforementioned German nuclear power plants could still be needed in a year's time. So, although it seemed unthinkable so far, it is still possible that nuclear power will remain in the energy mix in Germany after 15 April 2023. On the other hand, the leaders of the Green Party continue to talk about not allowing the purchase of new nuclear fuel and that the increased use of renewables, LNG, strengthened power grids will solve the problems of the coming months and the winter of 2023/2024. But if they are serious, why are the lignite plants being kept in operation?

 

Major parts of this writing was originally published on my Hungarian blog.