You just can't do that in Nuclear Power Plants!

The official YouTube channel of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant has a video of the Russian troops' attack on the plant, which at the time of this blog post has reached 4.2 million views. The footage, which lasts more than 4 hours, was recorded by a security surveillance camera and, although in low light, shows how the Russian attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP on 4 March 2022 could have happened. A more detailed, time-series analysis of the footage is available on this portal. This article is very interesting not only because it highlights the most relevant parts of the long security camera footage, but also because it shows the damage caused to the plant by the Russian attack, based on additional photos and video recordings of the plant.

It is clear from the footage that the Russian troops did not fire "only" at the training building: shots were also fired at Units 1 and 6, a transmission line pole was hit, and shoulder-launched rockets were fired at the main office building, as well as at the corridor connecting the units. Footage also shows the fences protecting the plant area being hit.

The moment when the transmission line pole in front of the power plant was hit
(Source: https://www.npr.org/2022/03/11/1085427380/ukraine-nuclear-power-plant-zaporizhzhia)

We also see the arrival of firefighters, who are then denied access to the site by the Russian troops, leaving the site unfinished as the fire in the buildings continues to burn.

It's frightening to see this footage, to see the irresponsibility of soldiers attacking a nuclear power plant. From personal communications with Ukrainian colleagues, we understand that several members of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant security guards have lost their lives in this fighting. We also know from personal communications that, since Russian troops have taken physical control, the operators of the plant have been forced to seek prior permission from the Russian military command for all essential technical operations. This information is confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a post on its website on 12 March 2022:

• The President of Energoatom, the Ukrainian nuclear power plant operator, officially informed the IAEA that about 400 Russian soldiers are permanently stationed at the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Although the plant's operation and staff shift changes are ongoing, he confirms that the management of the plant is under the control of the Russian military command. In this context, the IAEA Director General reiterates that the fact that operators are not allowed to take independent decisions in the course of their work and are forced to carry out their daily work under external pressure, in consultation with the Russian military, is a violation of one of the Agency's seven principles of nuclear safety. They even have to consult the Russian military leadership on technical matters.
• The IAEA's statement also indicates that the Ukrainian side informed the Agency on 12 March 2022 that the Russian side had attempted to take full control of the plant and place it under Rosatom's management system. Three days ago, this was reported in the international press, e.g. by Reuters, citing the Ukrainian side. Through our Ukrainian professional contacts, we have received the same information as Reuters.
• It would have been unprecedented if a foreign country had taken over the operation of a nuclear power plant in the territory of another country by military force, and this obviously raised serious doubts and concerns in the IAEA.
• According to the above-mentioned IAEA statement, the IAEA Director General, Mr Rafael Mariano Grossi, therefore spoke by telephone on 12 March with Mr Alexey Likhachev, the CEO of Rosatom, who confirmed that " a limited number of experts" from Rosatom were present at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, but denied that the management of the plant had been taken over and that the Russian side had intended to put the plant under Rosatom's management. He did not, however, say exactly how the Russian technical delegation had visited the site.
• According to the IAEA, Mr Likhachev confirmed the IAEA's information - coming from the Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Authority - that two of the plant's four transmission line connections were damaged in the fighting and that work is underway to repair the damage. Mr Likhachev also confirmed that additional diesel fuel for the diesel generators is being delivered to the site for safety reasons.
• According to the Russian statement, work is also underway to restore the physical protection system. This is necessary as the above-quoted footage shows that the physical protection barriers of the plant were damaged during the military attack.
• Also on 12 March, through an independent official channel, the Russian side informed the IAEA that it was providing technical assistance and consultations to the Ukrainian side for the safe operation of the nuclear power plants, but that the management and operation of the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhya and Chernobyl nuclear power plants were under Ukrainian control.
• Mr Likhachev told the IAEA Director General that there are Rosatom experts also at the Chernobyl site, diesel fuel supplies are being replenished and the Russian side has raised the possibility of establishing a transmission line connection to the Chernobyl site from Belarus.
• This means that the Russian side is exercising some kind of technical stewardship over the facilities, and may feel responsible for what happened.

All this news does not deny, but confirms, that Rosatom experts have been sent to the two Ukrainian nuclear sites occupied by the Russian army, and that the Rosatom CEO is apparently not only well informed about the technical situation there, but also has a clear idea of how to solve the technical problems that have emerged. Obviously, we do not know exactly how the Russian experts arrived at the sites, nor do we know what kind of personal communication took place during these discussions. It is clear that the Ukrainian and Russian communications are not consistent. However, there is agreement that Rosatom specialists are present at both Ukrainian power plants, with the sites being controlled by Russian armed forces. The Russian troops used military force against the plant's own armed guards during the invasion. All the conditions for intimidation and the use of force are in place, which is totally unacceptable in a nuclear facility.

According to the latest news, power has been restored to the Chernobyl site. This is an important development, as it means that after several days the electricity needed for essential safety functions will no longer have to be produced by diesel generators. However, it is interesting to note that it has been suggested that a power transmission line would be built from Belarus to ensure a secure power supply to the Chernobyl site. Belarus is close by, that is a fact, but could the condition of the Chernobyl-Kiev transmission line or the damage to the Kiev substation really be so serious that it would be necessary to build a new one in addition to the existing grid connection routes? Or is the aim to tighten the connection to Belarus? Or should the Chernobyl site be disconnected from Kiev's electricity network for some reason? It is not entirely clear what the Russian side's intentions are here. Later there were further interruption of electricity supply to Chernobyl NPP, which means that the situation is still far away being stable.

For my own part, I think that these recent developments point towards an escalation of the situation from a nuclear point of view rather than a calming solution. Rosatom has become directly involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which I think is a very bad development. The way in which the IAEA Director General has had to act in recent days shows the sensitivity of the situation, both from a nuclear diplomacy and from a nuclear safety and security point of view.

If Rosatom proceeds unskillfully in the current situation, it will face isolation on the international professional stage. And this would be a very bad outcome, if alone on the basis of historical experience: the isolation of the Soviet nuclear industry during the Cold War contributed greatly to the events leading to the 1986 Chernobyl accident. It would be a very bad development if Rosatom and Russia were now to follow a similar path.

The behaviour of the Russian side in Ukraine's nuclear power plants continues to raise serious concerns, not only among the lay public, but also among experts.

A return to normality is required!

The IAEA Communications regularly refer to the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, which can be found e.g. here.

1.      The physical integrity of the facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained;

2.      All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times;

3.      The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure;

4.      There must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites;

5.      There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites;

6.      There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures;

7.      There must be reliable communications with the regulator and others.

 

At the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya sites, their condition is, in my judgement, as follows:

1.    The physical integrity of the facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained; // Both sites are controlled by the military of a foreign country and namely by Russian soldiers, so the principle is violated. In Zaporizhzhya, the Russian attack has also damaged the barriers of physical protection.

2.      All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times; // There was no electricity at the Chernobyl site for an long period. Environmental measurements have been unavailable for days. The IAEA has been unable to access remote data from the safeguards system for days. We do not know the exact condition of the physical protection systems, but it is certain that they were damaged in the Zaporizhzhya attack and, according to Rosatom, they need to be repaired.

3.     The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure; // Based on the information available, the external pressure from the Russian side is clear. Ukrainian operators cannot take decisions independently. The psychological pressure on them can also be enormous. At the Chernobyl site, there has been no shift rotation for 18 days, so it is clear that the Ukrainian operators are under external pressure from the Russian side.

4.    There must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites; // Zaporizhzhya: the power plant has lost two of the 4 transmission line connections. Two of the lines are operational, so the condition is met, but the level of redundancy has been significantly reduced due to the Russian military attack. Chernobyl: the condition is clearly not met as there was no operational external grid connection for days.

5.     There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites; // Clearly not met. We have been receiving reports for weeks that food and medicine supplies at the Chernobyl site are limited. The Russian attacks have caused supply problems throughout the country. The fact that Rosatom wants to provide maintenance assistance also shows that the usual and necessary supply chains have been damaged. The conditions for transporting personnel and for shift rotations are also not given at Chernobyl.

6.   There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures; // The collection and display of radiation data from the Chernobyl site has been repeatedly impossible in recent weeks. The presence of foreign soldiers hardly helps emergency response. External military pressure on workers also violates this principle.

7.     There must be reliable communications with the regulator and others. // The IAEA has reported that this is clearly not the case at any of the sites.